Research Roundup: Thermal blankets for preemies, remote critical care, and mechanisms to accelerate Zika R&D

In this guest post Tom Harmon, senior policy analyst at the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), highlights a new analysis exploring the critical role of a vaccine in ending AIDS. Photo credit: IAVI When we talk about ending AIDS, what do we mean? The last dozen years have brought tremendous strides in reducing new HIV infections in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), expanding lifesaving treatment to almost 16 million people living with HIV, and implementing programs to address the epidemic in populations at especially high risk, including women and girls. But we must continue to push for progress in treatment and prevention. The 2 million new infections in 2014 remain far too high, and almost 60 percent of people needing treatment are not getting it. So, when we talk about conclusively and durably ending AIDS and ensuring that it does not bounce back, our experience with other infectious diseases shows that a preventive vaccine will be necessary. The global effort to develop an AIDS vaccine has also recently experienced significant successes and steps forward. For example, we’ve never before seen such a diversity of approaches and partners, with follow-on trials based on the first candidate to show modest efficacy slated to begin later this year in South Africa, exciting new insights toward generating protective antibodies against HIV, and promising approaches toward inducing cellular immune responses that could control HIV infection. Still, there are more far-reaching questions we’re asked today by policymakers, advocates, communities, and even researchers themselves: What would the global response look like if an AIDS vaccine was available? How effective would it need to be? Would it be cost-effective and affordable? A new article, published in PLoS ONE aims to answer some of these crucial questions. The result of a collaboration between IAVI, Avenir Health, and AVAC that builds on work by UNAIDS, this model specifically explores a vaccine’s potential value in terms of preventing HIV infections in LMICs. We analyzed a vaccine’s potential impact depending on how well the world can achieve ambitious HIV and AIDS program objectives, how effectively it can prevent HIV infection, and how it can add to a response that also includes pre-exposure prophylaxis and treatment as prevention. We also looked at cost scenarios to see how a vaccine would stand up to cost-effectiveness criteria used by the World Health Organization to guide the introduction of new health technologies. Despite the potential for today’s tools to have a substantial impact on the epidemic, our results show that a vaccine is a critical piece to ending AIDS. Under our base scenario, a vaccine of 70 percent efficacy with strong uptake would reduce HIV infections in LMICs by 44 percent in its first 10 years and by 65 percent in 25 years, ultimately averting tens of millions of infections and saving millions of lives. Reduction of new annual HIV infections with PrEP, TasP and vaccination added individually and in combination to the Full Scale-up of IFE between 2015 and 2070. A vaccine would be impactful and cost-effective even at lower efficacy levels and costs far higher than many of today’s vaccines. Increasing a vaccine’s efficacy, ensuring it protects for a longer period of time, reducing the number of doses, lowering the cost of a dose, and more effectively rolling it out are all factors that would increase a vaccine’s impact and its value. Such a vaccine could cut the number of people needing treatment in half by the year 2070, and eventually reduce the total cost of fighting AIDS in LMICs even when the additional cost of implementing the vaccination program is included. While these data provide a powerful illustration of a vaccine’s potential value, we acknowledge and welcome discussions of its intrinsic limitations, which reflect the areas the AIDS vaccine field and future program implementers will need to tackle as we research, develop, and ultimately deliver a vaccine to the people who need it most. Such an analysis helps explore the parameters that determine the medical and economic impact and value of a future AIDS vaccine as part of the comprehensive HIV and AIDS response. This data can be a useful guide for research portfolio decisions as new candidates move closer to efficacy trials. In many ways these projections are as much a vaccine development and delivery “to-do list” as they are a crystal ball for what the future holds. A few weeks ago, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention organized a Grand Rounds presentation on how models are used to guide pandemic responses. This interesting panel was closed by Dr. Richard Hatchett, chief medical officer and deputy director for strategic sciences at the US Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, who cited modeler Steven Bankes’ use of campfires as an analogy for predictive models, in that their value goes beyond their primary deliverable (be it light, heat, or data), as they just as importantly provide a “gathering place” for discussion between stakeholders. Our new model can perform just such a dual function, adding valuable context for a vaccine’s future role in ending the AIDS epidemic which has ravaged so many communities, while stimulating conversations and new questions on what we need to do in the real world to turn theory to impact.

WHO EB meets in Geneva. Photo: GHTC/Jana ArmstrongThere’s an old adage about political negotiating: “You need to be in the room when things are happening if you want to have an impact.” At its recent meeting, the World Health Organization (WHO) Executive Board (EB) discussed precisely who would be allowed in the room in the future under the proposed new Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA), which, if passed by the World Health Assembly (WHA), would set strict new rules and processes for WHO to follow in engaging with non-state actors (NSA)—including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), the private sector, and philanthropic foundations. These new policies impact everything from who is allowed to participate in governance meetings to the ways WHO can collaborate with local NGOs. To provide some context for the proposed changes, below is an overview of the current rules, the proposed new regulations, and some of the implications of particular concern for the global health research and development (R&D) world.Current rules governing engagement with NSAs The current rules governing WHO’s collaboration with NSAs derive from “Principles Governing Relations Between the World Health Organization and Nongovernmental Organizations.” The Principles recognize three levels of relations between WHO and NSAs: informal, working, and official. Informal relations consist of “…exchanges of information and reciprocal participation in technical meetings” and are designed to build a platform of shared priorities. They can continue on an ad-hoc basis for as long as necessary without any written agreement.If the relationship elevates to the level of specific joint programming and activities, WHO and the NSA can enter into a 2-year period of working relations. The two organizations exchange formal letters of commitment and agree to evaluate the outcome of the collaboration at the end of the joint activities. These types of collaboration do not require any decisions by the EB and can occur with WHO Secretariat staff approval; they do not grant any formal participation rights at the EB or WHA.To receive formal recognition and participation rights at the EB and WHA, an NSA must complete a successful period of working relations and submit an application to the EB. If admitted into formal relations, the NSA’s relationship with WHO is then subject to review every three years. If the application is rejected, the NSA cannot reapply until it has completed another period of working relations.Proposed new regulations The new proposed FENSA rules take a far different approach. Rather than recognizing three different categories of relations, it features only two: official relations and “engagement.” Unlike the current regulations, however, it does specify different rules of engagement depending on the type of NSA; NGOs/nonprofits are treated differently than philanthropic foundations, which are treated differently than academic institutions, which are in turn treated differently than the private sector. Of particular note for the R&D community, private-sector entities would be barred from official relations, as would any entities not “at arm’s length” from commercial sponsors or members. This could be interpreted to include some product development partnerships.Under FENSA, WHO would be required to create a publicly-available online register of every NSA it engages with at the global, regional, or country level. A pilot version of this register is currently available here. Each NSA that wished to engage with WHO would be required to populate all of the information shown in the link above as well as a to-be-determined section detailing the precise nature and funding of the engagement. For the purpose of registration requirements, engagements are defined as: participation in meetings, donation of resources, information/evidence sharing, advocacy efforts, and technical or programmatic collaboration. Essentially, as currently written, this category requires registration for almost any type of collaboration.When an organization proposes engagement(s), WHO Secretariat staff would be required to review both the organization’s information and the proposed activity in the register, as well as conduct a full due diligence assessment on risk management and potential conflicts of interest. Only after these processes have completed would the activity move forward. The staff burden of these processes is hard to overstate; the European WHO region had over 5,000 individual engagements with over 1,500 NSAs in 2014 alone.As shocking as it sounds, all of the above scrutiny would be required for simple “engagement,” not for official relations. In order to guarantee the right of representation at EB and WHA meetings, an organization would still need to submit a separate application with even more extensive documentation.Implications for the health R&D community Ultimately, FENSA, if implemented as it currently stands, does not seem likely to fix any problems, while it would likely create additional hurdles for the R&D community by: Greatly hindering the ability of WHO to collaborate with outside organizations by imposing a burdensome registration and review process for every type of engagement (no matter how small or informal). Potentially disenfranchising significant sectors of the global health R&D community by imposing stricter requirements that might redefine some product development partnerships as private-sector organizations that are not entitled to representation. The WHO working group revising FENSA will meet again in early April to attempt to reach an agreement so that they can present a consensus resolution to the WHA in May. We will be following the process very closely, and will provide further updates on this blog as they happen.